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ibrant public securities markets rely on complex systems 
of supporting institutions that promote the governance 
of publicly traded companies. Corporate governance structures 
serve: 1) to ensure that minority shareholders receive reliable 
information about the value of firms and that a company’s 
managers and large shareholders do not cheat them out of the 
value of their investments, and 2) to motivate managers to 
maximize firm value instead of pursuing personal objectives.1 
Institutions promoting the governance of firms include 
reputational intermediaries such as investment banks and 
audit firms, securities laws and regulators such as the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the United States, and 
disclosure regimes that produce credible firm-specific 
information about publicly traded firms. In this paper, we 
discuss economics-based research focused primarily on the 
governance role of publicly reported financial accounting 
information. 
Financial accounting information is the product of 
corporate accounting and external reporting systems that 
measure and routinely disclose audited, quantitative data 
concerning the financial position and performance of publicly 
held firms. Audited balance sheets, income statements, and 
cash-flow statements, along with supporting disclosures, form 
the foundation of the firm-specific information set available to 
investors and regulators. Developing and maintaining a 
sophisticated financial disclosure regime is not cheap. 
Countries with highly developed securities markets devote 
substantial resources to producing and regulating the use of 
extensive accounting and disclosure rules that publicly traded 
firms must follow. Resources expended are not only financial, 
but also include opportunity costs associated with deployment 
of highly educated human capital, including accountants, 
lawyers, academicians, and politicians. 
In the United States, the SEC, under the oversight of the U.S. 
Congress, is responsible for maintaining and regulating the 
required accounting and disclosure rules that firms must 
follow. These rules are produced both by the SEC itself and 
through SEC oversight of private standards-setting bodies such 
as the Financial Accounting Standards Board and the Emerging 
Issues Task Force, which in turn solicit input from business 
leaders, academic researchers, and regulators around the 
world. In addition to the accounting standards-setting 
investments undertaken by many individual countries and 
securities exchanges, there is currently a major, well-funded 
effort in progress, under the auspices of the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB), to produce a single set of 
accounting standards that will ultimately be acceptable to all 
countries as the basis for cross-border financing transactions.2 
The premise behind governance research in accounting is 
that a significant portion of the return on investment in 
accounting regimes derives from enhanced governance of 
firms, which in turn facilitates the operation of securities 
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markets and the efficient flow of scarce human and financial 
capital to promising investment opportunities. Designing a 
system that provides governance value involves difficult trade-
offs between the reliability and relevance of reported 
accounting information. While the judgments and 
expectations of firms’ managers are an inextricable part of any 
serious financial reporting model, the governance value of 
financial accounting information derives in large part from an 
emphasis on the reporting of objective, verifiable outcomes of 
firms. An emphasis on verifiable outcomes produces a rich set 
of variables that can support a wide range of enforceable 
contractual arrangements and that form a basis for outsiders to 
monitor and discipline the actions and statements of insiders.3 
A fundamental objective of governance research in 
accounting is to investigate the properties of accounting 
systems and the surrounding institutional environment 
important to the effective governance of firms. Bushman and 
Smith (2001) provide an extensive survey and discussion of 
governance research in accounting and provide ideas for future 
research. In this paper, we synthesize major research findings 
in the accounting governance literature and extend Bushman 
and Smith to consider corporate transparency more generally, 
which includes financial accounting information as one 
element of a complex information infrastructure.
We begin our discussion of governance research in Section 2 
with a framework for understanding the operation of 
accounting information in an economy. This framework 
isolates three channels through which financial accounting 
information can affect the investments, productivity, and 
value-added of firms. These channels involve the use of 
financial accounting information: 1) to identify promising 
investment opportunities, 2) to discipline managers to direct 
resources toward projects identified as good and away from 
projects that primarily benefit managers rather than owners of 
capital, and to prevent stealing, and 3) to reduce information 
asymmetries among investors. An important avenue for future 
research is the development of research designs to isolate the 
impact of accounting information through the individual 
channels and facilitate direct examination of the differential 
properties of the accounting system and institutional 
infrastructure important for each channel.
In Section 3, we discuss the direct use of financial 
accounting information in specific corporate governance 
mechanisms. The largest body of governance research in 
accounting examines the use of financial accounting 
information in the incentive contracts of top executives of 
publicly traded firms in the United States. This emphasis 
derives from the ready availability of top executive 
compensation data in the United States as a result of existing 
disclosure requirements, and from the success of contracting 
theory in supplying testable predictions of relations between 
performance measures and optimal compensation contracts. 
Researchers also have examined the role of accounting 
information in the operation of other governance mechanisms. 
Examples include takeovers, proxy contests, board of director 
composition, shareholder litigation, and debt contracts, among 
others. We distill major research findings and suggest ideas for 
future research. 
In Section 4, we discuss a developing literature using cross-
country research designs to examine links between financial 
sector development and economic outcomes. Within-country 
research holds most institutional features of a country fixed, 
precluding investigation of interactions across institutions. 
By exploiting cross-country differences in political structures, 
legal regimes, property rights protections, investors’ rights, 
regulatory frameworks, and other institutional characteristics, 
researchers can empirically explore connections between 
institutional configurations, including disclosure regimes, and 
economic outcomes. At the heart of theories connecting a well-
developed financial sector with enhanced resource allocation 
and growth is the role of the financial sector in reducing 
information costs and transaction costs.4 Despite the central 
role of information costs in these theories, until recently little 
attention has been given by empirical researchers to the role of 
the information environment per se in explaining cross-
country differences in economic growth and efficiency. 
Preliminary results from this emerging literature provide 
encouraging new evidence of a positive relation between the 
quality of financial accounting information and economic 
performance. This evidence suggests that future research into 
the governance role of financial accounting information has 
the potential to detect first-order economic effects. 
Finally, in Section 5, we present a conceptual framework for 
characterizing and measuring corporate transparency at the 
country level introduced in Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith 
(2001), hereafter BPS. Corporate transparency is defined as the 
widespread availability of relevant, reliable information about 
the periodic performance, financial position, investment 
opportunities, governance, value, and risk of publicly traded 
firms. BPS develop a measurement scheme for corporate 
transparency that is more comprehensive than the index of 
domestic corporate disclosure intensity used in prior cross-
country studies. Corporate transparency measures fall into 
three categories: 1) measures of the quality of corporate 
reporting, including the intensity, measurement principles, 
timeliness, and credibility (that is, audit quality) of disclosures 
by firms listed domestically, 2) measures of the intensity of 
private information acquisition, including analyst following, 
and the prevalence of pooled investment schemes and of 
insider trading activities, and 3) measures of the quality of FRBNY Economic Policy Review / April 2003 67
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information dissemination, including the penetration and 
private versus state ownership of the media. We describe the 
BPS framework to stimulate further thought on the 
measurement of corporate transparency and to illustrate 
promising directions for future research into the economic 
effects of corporate transparency, and into the economics of 
information more generally.
2. Channels through Which 
Financial Accounting Information 
Affects Economic Performance
A corporation can be viewed as a nexus of contracts designed 
to minimize contracting costs (Coase 1937). Parties 
contracting with the firm desire information both about the 
firm’s ability to satisfy the terms of contracts and the firm’s 
ultimate compliance with its contractual obligations. Financial 
accounting information supplies a key quantitative 
representation of individual corporations that supports a wide 
range of contractual relationships. Financial accounting 
information also enhances the information environment more 
generally by disciplining the unaudited disclosures of managers 
and supplying input into the information processing activities 
of outsiders.5 The quality of financial disclosure can impact 
firms’ cash flows directly, in addition to influencing the cost of 
capital at which the cash flows are discounted. We posit three 
channels through which financial accounting information 
improves economic performance, as illustrated in the exhibit.6 
First, financial accounting information of firms and their 
competitors aid managers and investors in identifying and 
evaluating investment opportunities. An absence of reliable 
and accessible information in an economy impedes the flow of 
human and financial capital toward sectors that are expected to 
have high returns and away from sectors with poor prospects. 
Even without agency conflicts between managers and 
investors, quality financial accounting data enhances efficiency 
by enabling managers and investors to identify value creation 
opportunities with less error. This leads directly to more 
accurate allocation of capital to highest valued uses, as 
indicated by arrow 1A in the exhibit. Lower estimation risk can 
also reduce the cost of capital, further contributing to 
economic performance, as indicated by arrow 1B.7 
Financial accounting systems clearly supply direct 
information about investment opportunities. For example, 
managers or potential entrants can identify promising new 
investment opportunities, acquisition candidates, or strategic 
innovations on the basis of the profit margins reported by 
other firms. Financial accounting systems also support the 
informational role played by stock price. As argued by 
Black (2000) and Ball (2001), a strong financial accounting 
regime focused on credibility and accountability is a 
prerequisite to the very existence of vibrant securities markets. 
Efficient stock markets in which stock prices reflect all public 
information and aggregate the private information of 
individual investors presumably communicate that aggregate 
information to managers and current and potential investors. 
Recent papers by Dow and Gorton (1997) and Dye and Sridhar 
(2001) explicitly model a strategy-directing role for stock 
prices. In these models, stock price impounds private, 
decision-relevant information not already known by managers, 
managers’ investment decisions respond to this new 
information in price, and the market correctly anticipates 
managers’ decision strategies in setting price. 
The second channel through which we expect financial 
accounting information to enhance economic performance is 
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opportunities is necessary, but not sufficient to ensure efficient 
allocation of resources. Given information asymmetry and 
potentially self-interested behavior by managers, agency 
theories argue that pressures from external investors, as well as 
formal contracting arrangements, are needed to encourage 
managers to pursue value-maximizing investment policies (for 
example, Jensen [1986]). Objective, verifiable accounting 
information facilitates shareholder monitoring and the 
effective exercise of shareholder rights under existing securities 
laws; enables directors to enhance shareholder value by 
advising, ratifying, and policing managerial decisions and 
activities; and supplies a rich array of contractible variables for 
determining the financial rewards from incentive plans 
designed to align executives’ and investors’ financial interests. 
Ball (2001) argues that timely incorporation of economic losses 
in the published financial statements (that is, conservatism) 
increases the effectiveness of corporate governance, 
compensation systems, and debt agreements in motivating and 
monitoring managers. He argues that it decreases the ex-ante 
likelihood that managers will undertake negative net present 
value (NPV) projects but pass on their earnings consequences 
to a subsequent generation, and it increases the incentive of the 
current generation of managers to incur the personal cost of 
abandoning investments and strategies that have ex-post 
negative NPVs. 
The governance role of financial accounting information 
contributes directly to economic performance by disciplining 
efficient management of assets in place (for example, timely 
abandonment of losing projects), better project selection, and 
reduced expropriation of investors’ wealth by the managers 
(exhibit, arrow 2A). We also allow for the possibility that 
financial accounting information lowers the risk premium 
demanded by investors to compensate for the risk of loss from 
expropriation by opportunistic managers (arrow 2B). 
However, we caution that the impact of improved governance 
on the rate of return required by investors is subtle. Lombardo 
and Pagano (2000) argue that the effect of improved 
governance on the required stock return on equity depends on 
the nature of the improvement. For instance, improved 
governance can manifest in a reduction of the private benefits 
that managers can extract from the company or in a reduction 
of the legal and auditing costs that shareholders must bear to 
prevent managerial opportunism. These two changes can have 
opposite effects on the observed equilibrium stock returns, and 
the size of these effects depends on the degree of international 
segmentation of equity markets.
The third channel through which we expect financial 
accounting information to enhance economic performance is 
by reducing adverse selection and liquidity risk (arrow 3). As 
documented in Amihud and Mendelson (2000), the liquidity 
of a company’s securities impacts the firm’s cost of capital. 
A major component of liquidity is adverse selection costs, 
which are reflected in the bid-ask spread and market impact 
costs. Firms’ precommitment to the timely disclosure of high-
quality financial accounting information reduces investors’ 
risk of loss from trading with more informed investors, thereby 
attracting more funds into the capital markets, lowering 
investors’ liquidity risk (see Diamond and Verrecchia [1991], 
Botosan [2000], Brennan and Tamarowski [2000], and Leuz 
and Verrecchia [2000]). Capital markets with low liquidity risk 
for individual investors can facilitate high-return, long-term 
(illiquid) corporate investments, including long-term 
investments in high-return technologies, without requiring 
individual investors to commit their resources over the long 
term (Levine 1997).9 Hence, well-developed, liquid capital 
markets are expected to enhance economic growth by 
facilitating corporate investments that are high-risk, high-
return, long-term, and more likely to lead to technological 
innovations, and high-quality financial accounting regimes 
provide important support for this capital market function.
In summary, we expect financial accounting information to 
enhance economic performance through at least three 
channels, one of which represents the governance role of 
financial accounting information. The impact of a country’s 
information infrastructure on the efficient allocation of capital 
is an important topic for future research. 
3. Direct Use of Accounting 
Information in Specific 
Governance Mechanisms
The roots of corporate governance research can be traced back 
to at least Berle and Means (1932), who argued that effective 
control over publicly traded corporations was not being 
exercised by the legal owners of equity, the shareholders, but by 
hired, professional managers. Given widespread existence of 
firms characterized by this separation of control over capital 
from ownership of capital, corporate governance research 
generally focuses on understanding mechanisms designed to 
mitigate agency problems and support this form of economic 
organization. There are of course a number of pure market 
forces that discipline managers to act in the interests of firms’ 
owners. These include product market competition (Alchian 
1950; Stigler 1958), the market for corporate control (Manne 
1965), and labor market pressure (Fama 1980). However, 
despite the existence of these powerful disciplining forces, there 
evidently remains residual demand for governance 
mechanisms tailored to the specific circumstances of individual 
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examining boards of directors, compensation contracts, 
concentrated ownership structures, debt contracts, and 
securities law in disciplining managers to act in the interests of 
capital suppliers (see Shleifer and Vishny [1997] for an 
insightful review of this literature). 
Governance research in accounting exploits the role of 
accounting information as a source of credible information 
variables that support the existence of enforceable contracts, 
such as compensation contracts with payoffs to managers 
contingent on realized measures of performance, the 
monitoring of managers by boards of directors and outside 
investors and regulators, and the exercise of investor rights 
granted by existing securities laws. The remainder of Section 3 
is organized as follows. Section 3.1 discusses evidence 
documenting widespread use of financial accounting measures 
in determining bonus payouts and dismissal probabilities for 
top executives, and in supporting the allocation of control 
rights and cash-flow rights in financing contracts between 
venture capitalists (VCs) and entrepreneurs. Section 3.2 
describes recent trends in the compensation contracts of top 
U.S. executives, including shifts in the relative importance of 
accounting numbers for determining compensation payouts, 
and discusses potential implications. Section 3.3 reviews 
research examining how characteristics of accounting 
information systems interact with the firms’ observed choices 
of governance configurations. Finally, Section 3.4 discusses 
evidence concerning the use of financial accounting 
information in corporate control mechanisms other than 
compensation contracts.
3.1 Prevalence of Financial Accounting 
Numbers in Top Executive 
Incentive Contracts
The extensive use of accounting numbers in top executive 
compensation plans at publicly traded firms in the United 
States is well documented. Murphy (1999) reports data from a 
survey conducted by Towers Perrin in 1996-97. Murphy 
reports that 161 of the 177 sample firms explicitly use at least 
one measure of accounting profits in their annual bonus plans. 
Of the sixty-eight companies in the survey that use a single 
performance measure in their annual bonus plan, sixty-five use 
a measure of accounting profits. Ittner, Larcker, and Rajan 
(1997) collect data on actual performance measures used in the 
annual bonus plans of 317 U.S. firms for the 1993-94 time 
period. Ittner et al. document that 312 of the 317 firms report 
use of at least one financial measure in their annual plans. 
Earnings per share, net income, and operating income are the 
most common financial measures. They also report that the 
mean percentage of annual bonus determined by financial 
performance measures is 86.6 percent across the whole sample, 
and 62.9 percent for the 114 firms that put nonzero weight on 
nonfinancial measures. Wallace (1997) and Hogan and Lewis 
(1999) together document adoption of residual income-based 
incentive plans (for example, EVA) by about sixty publicly 
traded companies. Numerous studies have also documented 
that both the earnings and shareholder wealth variables load 
positively and significantly in regressions of cash compensation 
on both performance measures (for example, Lambert and 
Larcker [1987], Jensen and Murphy [1990], and Sloan [1993]; 
Bushman and Smith [2001] thoroughly review this evidence). 
Poor earnings performance is also documented to increase 
the probability of executive turnover. Studies finding an 
inverse relation between accounting performance and CEO 
turnover include Weisbach (1988), Murphy and Zimmerman 
(1993), Lehn and Makhija (1997), and DeFond and Park 
(1999), while Blackwell, Brickley, and Weisbach (1994) 
document a similar relation for subsidiary bank managers 
within multibank holding companies.9 Weisbach (1988) and 
Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) include both accounting and 
stock price performance in the estimation of turnover 
probability. Weisbach finds that accounting performance 
appears to be more important than stock price performance in 
explaining turnover, while Murphy and Zimmerman find a 
significant inverse relation between both performance 
measures and turnover. 
This phenomenon has also been found to hold outside of 
the United States. Kaplan (1994a, b) finds that turnover 
probabilities for both Japanese and German executives are 
significantly related to earnings and stock price performance. 
Estimates of turnover probability in both countries indicate 
that stock returns and negative earnings are significant 
determinants of turnover.10 Regressions using changes in cash 
compensation of Japanese executives document a significant 
impact for pretax earnings and negative earnings, but not for 
stock returns and sales growth. Kaplan (1994a) compares 
results for Japanese executives with U.S. CEOs and finds 
turnover probabilities for Japanese executives more sensitive to 
negative earnings. This relative difference is suggestive of a 
significant monitoring role for a Japanese firm’s main banks 
when a firm produces insufficient funds to service loans. 
Kaplan documents that firms are more likely to receive new 
directors associated with financial institutions following 
negative earnings and poor stock price performance.
Finally, Kaplan and Stromberg (2000) document an 
important disciplining role for accounting information in 
private equity transactions. They examine actual financing 
contracts between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. They 
document that VC financings allow VCs to separately allocate 
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rights. The allocation of cash-flow rights and control rights is 
frequently contingent on verifiable, observable financial and 
nonfinancial performance measures. The financial measures 
appear to comprise standard measures from the financial 
accounting system, including earnings before interest and 
taxes, operating profits, net worth, and revenues. Control 
rights are allocated such that if the company performs poorly, 
the VCs take full control, while entrepreneurs obtain control as 
performance improves. They argue that this is supportive of 
theories that predict shifts of control to investors in bad 
outcome states, such as Aghion and Bolton (1992) and 
Dewatripont and Tirole (1994). 
3.2 Trends in the Use of Accounting Numbers 
for Contracting with Managers 
While the evidence documents significant use of accounting 
numbers in determining cash compensation, both the 
determinants of cash compensation and the importance of cash 
compensation in the overall incentive package exhibit 
significant time trends. Bushman, Engel, Milliron, and Smith 
(1998) document that over the 1971-95 period, firms have 
substituted away from accounting earnings toward other 
information in determining top executives’ cash 
compensation. 
It has also been documented that the contribution of cash 
compensation to the overall intensity of top executive 
incentives has diminished in recent years. Recent studies 
construct explicit measures of the sensitivity of the value of 
stock and option portfolios to changes in shareholder wealth 
(Murphy 1999; Hall and Liebman 1998). These studies show 
that the overall sensitivity of compensation to shareholder 
wealth creation (or destruction) is dominated by changes in the 
value of stock and stock option holdings, and that this 
domination increases in recent years. For example, Murphy 
(1999) estimates that for CEOs of mining and manufacturing 
firms in the S&P 500, the median percentage of total pay-
performance sensitivity related to stock and stock options 
increases from 83 percent (45 percent options and 38 percent 
stock) of total sensitivity in 1992 to 95 percent (64 percent 
options and 31 percent stock) in 1996. In addition, Core, Guay, 
and Verrecchia (2000) decompose the variance of changes in 
CEOs’ firm-specific wealth into stock-price-based and 
nonprice-based components. They find that stock returns are 
the dominant determinant of wealth changes, documenting 
that for 65 percent of the CEOs in their sample, the variation in 
wealth changes explained by stock returns is at least ten times 
greater than the component not explained by stock returns.
Why is the market share of accounting measures shrinking, 
and can cross-sectional differences in the extent of shrinkage be 
explained? Has the information content of accounting 
information itself deteriorated, or should we look to more 
fundamental changes in the economic environment? For 
example, Milliron (2000) documents a significant shift over the 
past twenty years in board characteristics measuring director 
accountability, independence, and effectiveness consistent with 
a general increase in directors’ incentive alignment with 
shareholders’ interests. A number of environmental changes 
are candidates for explaining the observed evolution in 
contract design and boards. 
For example, the emergence of institutional investor and 
other stakeholder activist groups in the 1980s created pressure 
on firms to choose board structures designed to facilitate more 
active monitoring and evaluation of managers’ performance. 
In addition, new regulations were instituted by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission and the Internal Revenue Service in 
the early 1990s to require that executive pay be disclosed in 
significantly more detail and be approved by a compensation 
committee composed entirely of independent directors. The 
nature of the firm itself may have changed. Recent research 
notes that conglomerates have broken up and their units spun 
off as stand-alone companies, that vertically integrated 
manufacturers have relinquished direct control of their 
suppliers and moved toward looser forms of collaboration, and 
that specialized human capital has become more important 
and also more mobile (for example, Zingales [2000] and Rajan 
and Zingales [2000]). 
In closing this section, we note that caution should be used 
in concluding from this recent shift away from explicit 
accounting-based incentive plans toward equity-based plans 
that accounting information has become less important for the 
governance of firms. There are a number of issues to consider 
in this regard. First, as discussed in our introduction and by a 
number of other scholars (for example, Ball [2001] and Black 
[2000]), the existence of a strong financial accounting regime is 
likely a precondition for the existence of a vibrant stock market 
and in its absence the notions of equity-based pay and diffuse 
ownership of firms become moot.
Second, while executive wealth clearly has become more 
highly dependent on stock price, managerial behavior is 
impacted by executives’ and boards’ understanding of how 
their decisions impact stock price. Under efficient markets 
theory, stock price is a sufficient statistic for all available 
information in the economy with respect to firm value, which 
implies that stock price is a good mechanism for guiding 
investors’ resource allocation decisions, as they only need to 
look at price to get the market’s informed assessment of value. 
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decisions and performance assessments within firms? That is, 
can managers and boards rely on stock price as their sole 
information source? We observe analysts pouring over the 
details of financial statements, such as margin analyses, 
expense ratios, and geographic and product line segment data. 
In addition, market participants expend real resources 
privately collecting and trading on detailed firm-specific 
information that is ultimately aggregated in price. Given that 
market participants whose trading decisions drive stock price 
formation are heavily influenced by detailed accounting and 
other performance data, why should we believe that managers 
and boards ignore the details and are guided solely by stock 
price? 
Lastly, stock price possesses other potential limitations as a 
measure of current managerial performance. In particular, the 
fact that stock price is forward-looking can limit its usefulness 
because it anticipates possible future actions. For example, 
when a firm is in trouble, its current stock price may reflect the 
market’s expectation that the current CEO will soon be 
replaced, thus limiting its usefulness in assessing the current 
CEO’s performance. This may lead to reliance on accounting 
measures, as documented in the literature on CEO dismissal 
probabilities discussed in Section 3.1 (see also the discussion in 
Section 3.4 on the role of accounting information in proxy 
contests).
3.3 Properties of Accounting and Choice
of Governance Configurations
In this section, we discuss research investigating relations 
between properties of financial accounting information and 
governance mechanism configurations. The premise behind 
this research is that when current accounting numbers do a 
relatively poor job of capturing information relevant to 
governance, firms substitute toward alternative, more costly 
governance mechanisms to compensate for inadequacies in 
financial accounting information. This research is based on the 
premise that financial accounting systems represent a primary 
source of effective, low-cost governance information. The 
research discussed next uses various proxies to capture the 
governance relevance of accounting numbers. Developing 
more refined measures of information quality is an important 
goal for future research.
Consider first the portfolio of performance measures 
chosen by firms to determine payouts from CEOs’ annual 
bonus plans. Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith (1996) study the 
use of “individual performance evaluation” in determining 
annual CEO bonuses. They use managerial compensation data 
from Hewitt Associates’ annual compensation surveys of large 
U.S. companies. This data set provides the percentage of a 
CEO’s annual bonus determined by individual performance 
evaluation (IPE). IPE is generally a conglomeration of 
performance measures including subjective evaluations of 
individual performance. For firms with significant growth 
opportunities, expansive investment opportunity sets, and 
long-term investment strategies, it is conjectured that current 
earnings will poorly reflect future period consequences of 
current managerial actions, and thus exhibit low sensitivity 
relative to important dimensions of managerial activities. This 
should lead firms to substitute toward alternative performance 
measures, including IPE. Bushman et al. (1996) proxy for the 
investment opportunity set with market-to-book ratios, and 
the length of product development and product life cycles. 
They find that IPE is positively and significantly related to both 
measures of investment opportunities, implying a substitution 
away from accounting information. 
Ittner, Larcker, and Rajan (1997) follow a similar research 
strategy focused on the use of nonfinancial performance 
measures. Using a combination of proprietary survey and 
proxy statement data, they estimate the extent to which CEO 
bonus plans depend on nonfinancial performance measures. 
The mean weight on nonfinancial measures across all firms in 
their sample is 13.4 percent, and 37.1 percent for all firms with 
a nonzero weight on nonfinancial measures. They construct 
a measure of investment opportunities using multiple 
indicators, including research and development (R&D) 
expenditures, market-to book ratio, and number of new 
product and service introductions. They find that the use of 
nonfinancial performance measures increases with their 
measure of investment opportunities.
Substitution away from publicly reported accounting data 
likely leads to the use of performance measures in contracts 
that are not directly observable by the market. Hayes and 
Schaeffer (2000) extend Bushman et al. (1996) and Ittner et al. 
(1997) by investigating the relation between executive 
compensation and future firm performance. If firms optimally 
use unobservable measures of performance that are correlated 
with future observable measures of performance, then 
variation in current compensation that is not explained by 
variation in current observable performance measures should 
predict future variation in observable performance measures. 
Further, compensation should be more positively associated 
with future earnings when observable measures of 
performance are noisier and, hence, less useful for contracting. 
They test these assertions using panel data on CEO cash 
compensation from Forbes, and show that current 
compensation is related to future return-on-equity after 
controlling for current and lagged performance measures and 72 Transparency, Financial Accounting Information
analyst consensus forecasts of future accounting performance, 
and that current compensation is more positively related to 
future performance when the variances of the firm’s market 
and accounting returns are higher. They detect no time trend 
in the relation between current compensation and future 
performance. This stability is noteworthy given the significant 
increases in the use of option grants documented by Hall and 
Liebman (1998) and Murphy (1999). Boards of directors 
apparently have not delegated the complete determination of 
CEO rewards to the market, and still fine-tune rewards using 
private information.
Bushman, Chen, Engel, and Smith (2000) extend this 
research to consider a larger range of governance mechanisms. 
The governance mechanisms considered include board 
composition, stockholdings of inside and outside directors, 
ownership concentration, and the structure of executive 
compensation. They conjecture that to the extent that current 
earnings fail to incorporate current value-relevant 
information, the accounting numbers are less effective in the 
governance setting. The authors develop several proxies to 
measure earnings “timeliness” based on traditional and reverse 
regressions of stock prices and changes in earnings. Consistent 
with the hypothesis that limits to the information provided by 
financial accounting measures are associated with a greater 
demand for firm-specific information from inside directors 
and high-quality outside directors (Fama and Jensen 1983), 
Bushman et al. find that the proportion of inside directors and 
the proportion of “highly reputable” outside directors are 
negatively related to the timeliness of earnings, after 
controlling for R&D, capital intensity, and firm growth 
opportunities. They also find a negative relation between the 
timeliness of earnings and the stockholdings of inside and 
outside directors, the extent of ownership concentration, the 
proportion of incentive plans granted to the top five executives 
that are long-term plans, and the proportion that are equity-
based.
Finally, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1998) argue that protection of investors from opportunistic 
managerial behavior is a fundamental determinant of 
investors’ willingness to finance firms, of the resulting cost of 
firms’ external capital, and of the concentration of stock 
ownership. They develop an extensive database of the laws 
concerning the rights of investors and the enforcement of these 
laws for forty-nine countries, from Africa, Asia, Australia, 
Europe, North America, and South America. Interestingly, one 
of the regimes that they suggest affects enforcement of 
investors’ rights is the country’s financial accounting regime. 
They measure quality of the accounting regime with an index 
developed for each country by the Center for International 
Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR). The CIFAR index 
represents the average number of ninety items included in the 
annual reports of a sample of domestic companies. They 
document that the concentration of stock ownership in a 
country is significantly negatively related to both the CIFAR 
index and an index of how powerfully the legal system “favors 
minority shareholders against managers or dominant 
shareholders in the corporate decision-making process, 
including the voting process” (1995, p. 1127), after controlling 
for the colonial origin of the legal system and other factors. 
These results are consistent with their prediction that in 
countries where the accounting and legal systems provide 
relatively poor investor protection from managerial 
opportunism, there is a substitution toward costly monitoring 
by “large” shareholders.
3.4 Financial Accounting Information 
and Additional Corporate Control 
Mechanisms
In this section, we expand our discussion of the role of financial 
accounting information in the operation of specific governance 
mechanisms. An important example in this respect is 
DeAngelo’s (1988) study of the role of accounting information 
in proxy fights. She documents a heightened importance of 
accounting information during proxy fights by providing 
evidence of the prominent use of accounting numbers. She 
presents evidence that dissident stockholders typically cite poor 
earnings performance as evidence of incumbent managers’ 
inefficiency (and rarely cite stock price performance), and that 
incumbent managers use their accounting discretion to portray 
a more favorable impression of their performance to voting 
shareholders. DeAngelo suggests that accounting information 
may better reflect incumbent managerial performance during 
proxy fights because stock price anticipates potential benefits 
from removing underperforming incumbent managers.11
It is also important to recognize that the governance of firms 
is exercised through a portfolio of governance mechanisms, 
and so it is important to understand potential interactions 
between mechanisms. Consider product market competition 
and the use of accounting information in governance. 
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) argue that in more competitive 
industries (higher product substitutability), wage contracts are 
designed to incorporate strategic considerations and create 
incentives for less aggressive price competition. DeFond and 
Park (1999) and Parrino (1997), examining CEO turnover 
probabilities, posit that in more competitive industries, peer 
group comparisons are more readily available, creating 
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Jagannathan and Srinivasan (1999) examine whether product 
market competition, as measured by whether a firm is a 
generalist (likely to have more comparable firms) or a specialist 
(few peers), reduces agency costs in the form of free cash-flow 
problems. If increased competition reduces agency costs and 
creates more peer comparison opportunities (including the 
supply of potential replacement executives), how is the design 
of incentive contracts impacted? Competition can impact the 
relative value of own-firm and peer-group accounting 
information as a function of competitiveness. It is also possible 
that the extent of competition influences the costs to disclosing 
proprietary information, impacting the amount of private 
information and the relative governance value of public 
performance measures.
Bertrand and Mullainathan (1998) illustrate the potential 
power of designs that consider interactions across governance 
mechanisms. They examine the impact on executive 
compensation of changes in states’ anti-takeover legislation. 
Adoption of anti-takeover legislation presumably reduces 
pressure on top managers. They attempt to distinguish 
between optimal contracting and skimming theories in 
explaining observed contracting arrangements. Do share-
holders, observing weakening of one disciplining mechanism, 
respond by strengthening another, say, pay-for-performance? 
Or do CEOs facing reduced threat of hostile takeover exploit 
this reduced pressure to skim more resources by increasing 
their mean pay? They find that pay-for-performance 
sensitivities (especially for accounting measures of perform-
ance) and mean levels of CEO pay increase after adoption of 
anti-takeover legislation. They further separate their sample 
into two groups based on whether the firm has a large 
shareholder (5 percent blockholder) present or not. They 
find that firms with a large shareholder increased pay-for-
performance, while firms without a large shareholder increased 
mean pay. They also empirically examine the responsiveness of 
pay to luck, using three measures of luck. First, they perform a 
case study of oil-extracting firms where large movements in oil 
prices tend to affect firm performance on a regular basis. 
Second, they use changes in industry-specific exchange rates 
for firms in the traded goods sector. Third, they use year-to-
year differences in mean industry performance to proxy for the 
overall economic fortunes of a sector. For all three measures, 
they find that CEO pay responds to luck. However, similar to 
the takeover results, they find that the presence of a large 
shareholder reduces the amount of pay for luck. These results 
raise important questions about the optimality of observed 
governance configurations in the United States.
Finally, complex interactions can exist between incentive 
contracts written on objective performance measures and 
features of organizational design such as promotion ladders, 
allocation of decision rights, task allocation, divisional 
interdependencies, and subjective performance evaluation. 
Lambert, Larcker, and Weigelt (1993) present evidence that 
observed business unit managers’ compensation across the 
hierarchy exhibits patterns consistent with both agency 
theory and tournament theory. Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom 
(1994a, b) and Gibbs (1995) analyze twenty years of 
personnel data from a single firm and illustrate the complex 
relations that can exist among the hierarchy, performance 
evaluation, promotion policies, wage policies, and incentive 
compensation. Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994) 
theoretically isolate economic tradeoffs between objective 
and subjective performance evaluation in the design of 
optimal contracting arrangements. Ichniowski, Shaw, and 
Prennushi (1997), using data on thirty-six steel mills, find 
that mills that adopt bundles of complementary practices (for 
example, incentive compensation, teamwork, skills training, 
and communications) are more productive than firms that 
either do not adopt these practices or that adopt practices 
individually rather than together.
4. Effects of Financial Accounting 
Information on Economic 
Performance
A growing body of evidence indicates that the development of 
a country’s financial sector facilitates its growth (for example, 
King and Levine [1993], Jayaratne and Strahan [1996], Levine 
[1997], Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic [1998], and Rajan 
and Zingales [1998]). Levine (1997) presents a framework 
whereby a well-developed financial sector facilitates the 
allocation of resources by serving five functions: to mobilize 
savings, facilitate risk management, identify investment 
opportunities, monitor and discipline managers, and facilitate 
the exchange of goods and services. At the heart of these 
theories is the role of the financial sector in reducing 
information costs and transaction costs in an economy. In spite 
of the central role of information in these theories, until 
recently little attention has been given by empirical researchers 
to the information environment per se in explaining cross-
country differences in economic growth and efficiency.
In this section, we discuss research that explicitly examines 
the role of a country’s corporate disclosure regime in the 
efficient allocation of capital. Preliminary results from this 
literature provide encouraging evidence of a positive relation 
between the quality of a country’s corporate disclosure regime 
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promising way to assess the effects of corporate disclosure on 
economic performance for several reasons. First, there are 
considerable, quantifiable cross-country differences in 
corporate disclosure regimes.12 Second, there are dramatic 
cross-country differences in economic efficiency. Rajan and 
Zingales (2001), Modigliani and Perotti (2000), and Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson (2000) argue that inefficient institutions 
can be sustained in a given country due to political agendas other 
than efficiency. Hence, the possibility of observing grossly 
inefficient financial accounting and other regimes in the cross-
country sample is not ruled out. In contrast, within the United 
States, where market forces and explicit and implicit 
compensation contracts powerfully discipline managers, 
inefficiencies are more difficult to isolate in the data. 
However, there are also limitations to this approach. The 
explanatory variables in these studies are highly correlated and 
measured with error, impeding interpretation of results. This is 
a significant issue for interpreting results on the basis of the 
CIFAR index (described above), which is commonly used to 
measure the “quality” of accounting information within a 
country. The CIFAR index is highly correlated with numerous 
other country characteristics. Furthermore, given the 
crudeness of the CIFAR index, the quality of countries’ 
financial accounting regimes is probably measured with 
considerable error. A second limitation is that causal inferences 
are problematic. It is plausible that both measures of financial 
development, such as the CIFAR index, and measures of 
economic performance are caused by the same omitted factors. 
It is also plausible that economic performance stimulates 
development of extensive financial disclosure systems. These 
limitations of cross-country designs are well recognized in the 
economics literature. Levine and Zervos (1993) conclude that 
these studies can be “very useful” as long as empirical 
regularities are interpreted as “suggestive” of the hypothesized 
relations. Lack of cross-country relations can at a minimum 
cast doubt on hypothesized relations.
Rajan and Zingales (1998) argue that if financial institutions 
help firms overcome moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems, thus reducing the cost of raising money from 
outsiders, financial development should disproportionately 
help firms more dependent on external finance for their 
growth. They measure an industry’s demand for external 
finance from data on U.S. firms. If capital markets in the 
United States are relatively frictionless, this allows them to 
identify an industry’s technological demand for external 
financing. Assuming that this demand carries over to other 
countries, they test whether industries that are more dependent 
on external financing grow relatively faster in countries that are 
more financially developed. Using the CIFAR index as a 
measure of financial development, Rajan and Zingales  
document a significant positive coefficient on the interaction 
between industry-level demand for external financing and the 
country-level CIFAR index. This result supports the prediction 
that the growth is disproportionately higher in industries with 
a strong exogenous demand for external financing in countries 
with high-quality corporate disclosure regimes, after 
controlling for fixed industry and country effects. They also 
find that growth in the number of new enterprises is 
disproportionately high in industries with a high demand for 
external financing in countries with a large CIFAR index. 
Using a similar design, Carlin and Mayer (2000) find that 
the growth in industry GDP and the growth in R&D spending 
as a share of value-added are disproportionately higher in 
industries with a high demand for external equity financing in 
countries with a large CIFAR index. Together, the results of 
Rajan and Zingales, and Carlin and Mayer are consistent with 
high-quality disclosure regimes promoting growth and firm 
entry by lowering the cost of external financing. However, as 
illustrated in the exhibit, corporate disclosure can also impact 
economic performance directly through the project 
identification and governance channels. For example, future 
research can focus on the governance channel by developing 
proxies for the relative magnitude of inherent agency costs 
from shareholder-manager conflicts for each industry, 
regardless of where the industry is located. Measures of 
economic performance for each industry within each country 
can be regressed against the interaction of the inherent agency 
costs for the industry and the quality of the corporate 
disclosure regime in the country. 
Love (2000) examines the hypothesis that financial 
development affects growth by decreasing information and 
contracting related imperfections in the capital markets, thus 
reducing the wedge between the cost of external and internal 
finance at the firm level. Estimating a structural model of 
investment using firm-level data from forty countries, the 
paper finds that financial development decreases the sensitivity 
of investment to the availability of internal funds, which is 
equivalent to a decrease in financing constraints and 
improvement in capital allocation. Love’s main indicator of 
financial development is an index combining measures of stock 
market development with measures of financial intermediary 
development. Although the paper’s main result is that this 
indicator of financial development is negatively related to the 
estimated measure of capital market imperfection, it is 
interesting to note that the CIFAR index loads negatively over 
and above the main financial development indicator, while 
separate measures of the efficiency of the legal system, 
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Wurgler (2000) examines the extent to which capital in each 
country is allocated to value-creating opportunities and 
withdrawn from value-destroying ones. Wurgler estimates the 
elasticity of gross investment to value-added as a measure of 
the efficiency of resource allocation in each country from 
equation 1:
(1)        ,
where Ijkt is gross fixed capital formation in industry j, 
country k, year t, Vjkt is value-added in industry j, country k, 
year t. Wurgler interprets the elasticity for each country k, , 
as a measure of the extent to which country k reduces 
investment in declining industries and increases investment
in growing industries. He documents a significant positive 
relation between value-added elasticities and financial 
development as measured by the ratio of the stock market 
capitalization to GDP and the ratio of credit outstanding to 
GDP. He also finds a positive relation between value-added 
elasticities and an index of investor rights from La Porta et al. 
(1998), and a significant negative relation between elasticities 
and the fraction of an economy’s output due to state-owned 
enterprises. Most interesting for our purposes, however, is that 
he documents a significant relation between elasticities and a 
measure proxying for the amount of firm-specific information 
impounded in stock prices in a given economy, supporting the 
hypothesis that more informed stock prices provide better 
direction for managers’ investment decisions.13 We are not 
aware of any direct evidence concerning the relation between the 
quality of financial accounting regimes and the sensitivity of 
corporate investments to value-added. This is an interesting 
issue for future research.
We note two final studies that have exploited the CIFAR 
index. First, Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) examine whether 
cross-country differences in legal and accounting systems 
explain differences in the level of financial intermediary 
development. They find that cross-country differences in legal 
and accounting systems (measured using the CIFAR index) 
help account for differences in financial development. These 
findings suggest that legal and accounting reforms that 
strengthen creditor rights, contract enforcement, and 
accounting practices can boost financial development and 
accelerate economic growth. Second, Lombardo and Pagano 
(2000) document that total stock market returns are correlated 
with overall measures of the quality of institutions, such as 
judicial efficiency and rule of law, controlling for risk. They also 
examine whether differences in accounting standards are a key 
explanatory variable of the international variation in initial 
public offering (IPO) underpricing. The presence of IPO 
lnIjkt Ijkt 1 – α k η klnV jkt Vjkt 1 – ε jkt + ⁄ + = ⁄
η k
underpricing is generally viewed as the product of 
informational asymmetries between generality of investors and 
the “smart money” in the market for new issues. Shares initially 
quote at a discount to compensate uninformed investors for 
their expected losses to the better-informed ones. This 
informational asymmetry and the resulting IPO discount are 
likely to be greater where accounting practices are lax and 
opaque. Consistent with the prediction of the theory, they 
document a negative correlation between IPO underpricing 
and the CIFAR index.
We end this section by noting that there is also an 
emerging literature in accounting that examines the relation 
between properties of a country’s financial reporting regime 
and its institutional architecture (see Ball [2001] for a 
synthesis of this literature). Ball, Kothari, and Robin (2000) 
and Ball and Robin (1999) document significant differences 
in the extent to which accounting income incorporates 
economic gains and losses in code-law versus common-law 
countries. They find that common-law accounting income 
is more likely than code-law income to incorporate 
economic losses in a timely fashion. They argue that 
considerable managerial discretion over reported income, 
and a near absence of stockholder and lender litigation costs 
to managers and auditors alike in code-law countries, 
reduces their incentives to confront economic losses and to 
recognize them in the financial statements.14 Guenther and 
Young (2000) investigate how cross-country differences in 
legal systems, bank versus market orientation, and legal 
protection for external shareholders affect the relation 
between financial accounting earnings and real economic 
value-relevant events that underlie those earnings. They find 
that the association between aggregate return on assets and 
growth in GDP is high in the United Kingdom and the 
United States (common law, extensive use of markets, and 
high protection of minority shareholder rights) and low in 
France and Germany (code law, extensive use of banks, and 
low protection of minority shareholder rights). Lastly, Ali 
and Hwang (2000), using financial accounting data from 
manufacturing firms in sixteen countries for 1986-95, 
demonstrate that the value relevance of financial reports is 
lower in countries where the financial systems are bank-
oriented rather than market-oriented, where private sector 
bodies are not involved in the standards-setting process, 
where accounting practices follow the Continental model as 
opposed to the British-American model, where tax rules 
have a greater influence on financial accounting measure-
ments, and where spending on auditing services is relatively 
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5. Future Research: Corporate 
Transparency
The studies reviewed in Section 4 provide exciting new 
evidence that cross-country differences in corporate disclosure 
intensity, as measured by the CIFAR index, are associated with 
differences in economic growth, efficient allocation of 
investment, sensitivity of investment to internal cash flow, 
development of financial intermediaries, IPO underpricing, 
and concentration of stock ownership.
A natural next step is the development of a more 
comprehensive framework for conceptualizing and measuring 
the key aspects of the domestic information environment.
A fundamental feature of the information environment is 
corporate transparency, defined as the widespread availability 
of relevant, reliable information about the periodic 
performance, financial position, investment opportunities, 
governance, value, and risk of publicly traded firms (Bushman, 
Piotroski, and Smith 2001). As a measure of corporate 
transparency, the CIFAR index used in prior studies has at least 
three major shortcomings. First, it captures only one 
dimension of the quality of corporate reporting-disclosure 
intensity. Second, the CIFAR index does not capture cross-
country differences in the extent, speed, or accuracy with which 
information reported by firms is disseminated throughout the 
economy. Third, the CIFAR index does not incorporate cross-
country differences in private information acquisition and 
communication activities.15 
BPS develop a framework for conceptualizing and measuring 
corporate transparency at the country level. In their framework, 
corporate transparency has three main elements: 1) corporate 
reporting (voluntary and mandatory), 2) information 
dissemination via the media and Internet channels, and
3) private information acquisition and communication by 
financial analysts, institutional investors, and corporate insiders. 
We describe the framework here to stimulate further thought on 
the measurement of corporate transparency and of domestic 
information environments more generally. We also use their 
framework to illustrate some directions for future research into 
the economics of information. 
The first element in the BPS framework is the quality of 
corporate reporting. They consider not only corporate 
disclosure intensity as measured by the CIFAR index, but also 
the prevalence of specific types of accounting and governance 
disclosures, the timeliness of disclosures, and the credibility of 
disclosures as measured by the share of Big-6 accounting firms 
in total value audited. All measures of corporate reporting used 
in BPS are collected from Center for International Financial 
Analysis and Research (1995), and appear in the table.
Variables Used to Measure Corporate 
Transparency and Data Sourcesa
Corporate reportingb
Financial accounting disclosures
Long-term investments: Research and development,
  capital expenditures




Identity of major shareholders
Range of shareholdings
Identity of managers
Identity of board members and affiliations
Remuneration of officers and directors
Shares owned by directors and employees
Timeliness of disclosures
Frequency of reporting
Number of specific accounting items disclosed in interim reports
Consolidation in interim reporting
Reporting of subsequent events
Accounting policies
Consolidation of subsidiaries
Use of general reserves
Credibility of disclosures
Share of Big-6 accounting firms in total value audited
Other
Financial statements available in English
Degree of disclosure of important accounting policies
Information dissemination
Penetration of mediac
Number of newspapers per 1,000 people
Number of televisions per 1,000 people
Media ownershipd
Percentage state-owned newspapers of top five daily newspapers
  in 1999
Market share of state-owned newspapers of aggregate market share
  of top five daily newspapers in 1999
Private information acquisition and communication
Direct reporting of detailed private information
Number of analysts following firmse
Indirect communication of aggregate value-relevant information
  via trades
Prevalence of institutional investorsf
Total assets of pooled investment schemes to GDP
Insider trading laws and enforcementg
aSource: Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2001).
bSource: Center for International Financial Analysis and Research (1995).
cSource: World Development Indicators (2000).
dSource: Djankov, McLiesh, Nenova, and Shleifer (2001).
eSource: Chang, Khanna, and Palepu (2000).
fSource: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (1999).
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The second element is private information acquisition and 
communication by financial analysts, institutional investors, and 
corporate insiders. BPS measure private information acquisition 
of financial analysts by the average number of financial analysts 
following large companies, as reported in Chang, Khanna, and 
Palepu (2000). They measure private information acquisition by 
institutional investors by the assets of pooled investment 
schemes relative to GDP. Finally, they measure insider trading by 
the degree of enforcement of restrictions on insider trading, as 
reported in Bhattacharya and Daouk (2001).
The third element in the BPS framework is the quality of 
information dissemination throughout the economy. They 
consider two aspects of the information dissemination 
infrastructure in a given economy that are expected to affect 
the speed, accuracy, and reach of the dissemination of 
information reported by firms. The first aspect is the 
penetration of media, as measured by the number of 
newspapers and televisions per capita obtained from World 
Development Indicators (2000). The second aspect is the 
prevalence of state versus private ownership of newspapers, as 
reported in Djankov, McLiesh, Nenova, and Shleifer (2001).16 
This extended representation of corporate transparency 
allows a variety of research questions to be addressed. We 
discuss three sets of questions for future research: 1) the 
relation among measures of the quality of corporate reporting, 
information dissemination, and private information 
acquisition and communication in an economy; 2) the 
economic consequences of the quality of corporate reporting, 
information dissemination, and private information 
acquisition, including interactions among these three elements 
of corporate transparency and interactions with legal and other 
domestic institutions; and 3) political, economic, or other 
reasons for cross-country or intertemporal differences in 
corporate transparency.
The relation among measures of the quality of corporate 
reporting, information dissemination, and private information 
acquisition and communication. An intriguing direction for 
future research is the relation of measures within and across the 
three elements of corporate transparency: the quality of 
corporate reporting, information dissemination, and private 
information acquisition and communication. For example, is 
higher quality corporate reporting associated with higher 
quality channels for dissemination of the information reported 
by firms? Do lax restrictions on insider trading encourage or 
stifle corporate reporting? Is higher audit rigor associated with 
greater disclosure intensity? Do lax restrictions on insider 
trading suppress private information acquisition and 
communication by financial analysts or institutional investors?
We are aware of no existing empirical research into the 
relation of measures within and across the three elements of 
corporate transparency. A theory literature in accounting is 
replete with examples of public and private information being 
either substitutes or complements. Verrecchia (1982) models 
increased public disclosure as crowding out private 
information, while Indjejikian (1991) models public disclosure 
as driving increased levels of private information (see also 
Antle, Demski, and Ryan [2000] for further discussion of this 
literature). This is ultimately an empirical issue. The recent 
emergence of databases that capture substantial cross-country 
variation in the elements of corporate transparency creates 
potential for important new insights into the relation between 
components of corporate transparency. 
Economic consequences of the quality of corporate reporting, 
information dissemination, and private information acquisition 
and communication. A second interesting direction for future 
research is the economic consequences of the quality of 
corporate reporting, information dissemination, and private 
information acquisition and communication. A variety of 
economic effects are of interest, such as the cost of debt and 
equity capital, the stability of the financial sector, the size of the 
capital markets, the liquidity, informational efficiency, and 
functional efficiency of the stock market,17 the intensity of 
investments in high-risk technologies, the growth in the number 
of firms, the speed and intensity with which financial and human 
capital are invested in value-creating opportunities and 
withdrawn from value-destroying ones, and GDP growth.18
In the investigation of the economic effects of corporate 
reporting, future research can go beyond disclosure intensity to 
consider the economic effects of specific types of accounting or 
governance disclosures, as well as the timeliness, measurement, 
credibility, or language of corporate disclosures. Research can 
also consider whether these dimensions of the quality of 
corporate reporting have complementary economic effects, 
such as complementarities between disclosure intensity on the 
one hand, and timeliness, credibility, or measurement of 
disclosures on the other hand. 
In the investigation of the economic effects of information 
dissemination, future research can explore the effects of the 
per-capita penetration of the media, the state versus private 
ownership of the media, and interactions between the 
penetration and ownership of the media. We also think it is 
interesting to explore whether corporate reporting and 
information dissemination have complementary economic 
effects, whereby the economic effects of quality corporate 
reporting are enhanced by a quality information dissemination 
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In the investigation of the economic effects of private 
information acquisition and dissemination, future research can 
consider the independent effects of the private information 
activities of financial analysts, institutional investors, and 
corporate insiders. We also think there are potentially interesting 
interactions to explore between private information acquisition 
on the one hand, and corporate reporting and information 
dissemination on the other hand. For example, evidence in 
Bhattacharya and Daouk (2001) suggests that relatively weak 
enforcement of restrictions on insider trading is associated with 
a relatively high cost of equity capital. Is this effect mitigated by 
high-quality corporate reporting and information 
dissemination, as expected if high-quality corporate reporting 
and information dissemination reduce information asymmetries 
between corporate insiders and other investors?
Although the suggestions above concern the interactions 
among the components of corporate transparency, we also 
think it is promising to consider potential interactions between 
measures of corporate transparency and other domestic 
institutions. For example, since LaPorta, Lopez-De-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1997), researchers have documented a 
variety of economic effects of the domestic legal regime, such 
as laws protecting investors’ rights and enforcement of laws. 
A recent example of studies in this vein is Lombardo (2000), 
who documents evidence that the cost of equity capital is 
negatively associated with the enforceability of contracts and 
the impartiality and observance of the law, while it is 
positively associated with corruption and risk of 
expropriation. 
Another natural direction for future research is to 
understand how—that is, through which specific channels—
corporate transparency achieves its first-order economic 
effects. For example, to what extent do high-quality corporate 
reporting and information dissemination lead to better 
corporate governance, producing gains through the 
governance channel depicted in the exhibit? Bushman and 
Smith (2001) discuss empirical designs that can be used to 
isolate the economic effects of financial accounting 
information operating through the governance channel. 
Similar designs can be used to isolate the economic effects of 
additional elements of corporate transparency through the 
governance channel.
Political, economic, or other reasons for cross-country and 
intertemporal differences in corporate transparency. The research 
proposed above is motivated at a fundamental level by an 
interest in the question of what combination or combinations 
of domestic institutions are most conducive to economic 
growth and efficiency. We think that the more comprehensive 
measurement of corporate transparency illustrated by the BPS 
framework will generate new insights into how and why the 
availability of relevant, reliable information about firms from a 
variety of sources affects economies, and how these economic 
effects vary with other factors.
We think that another important direction for future research 
is to explore why elements of corporate transparency vary across 
countries and over time. We expect that evidence concerning the 
efficiency effects of corporate transparency and how they vary 
with the financial architecture, industrial development, corporate 
governance structures, globalization, or other factors will guide 
the development of hypotheses concerning intercountry and 
intertemporal differences in the demand for corporate 
transparency. We also think that recent theories predicting the 
political conditions under which financial development will be 
suppressed to promote agendas other than economic efficiency 
and new databases measuring these political forces will provide 
valuable input into this line of inquiry.19
Of particular interest is the role of regulation in promoting 
corporate transparency. Although there has been much debate 
on disclosure regulation, there is no universal agreement on 
what disclosure regulation should be or whether regulation is 
even necessary, thus leaving many open questions. A large 
literature on corporate governance assumes that financial 
market regulation is unnecessary. This conclusion relies on the 
idea that sophisticated parties can write enforceable contracts 
tied to their specific circumstances and that entrepreneurs have 
adequate incentives to minimize agency costs through 
bonding, commitment to audited disclosure, and other limits 
on discretion.20 Implied in this position is the existence of 
effective judicial enforcement of complex contractual 
arrangements and an absence of externalities. 
However, advocates of market regulation point to a variety 
of potential failures, such as the ability of insiders to 
expropriate both potential and existing investors through 
misrepresentation or asset diversion, or a lack of incentives by 
courts to enforce laws and contracts effectively. Some scholars 
argue for the enforcement of securities laws by regulators as 
opposed to judges. For example, Glaeser, Johnson, and Shleifer 
(2000) argue that regulators may be required to provide 
adequate resources and high-powered incentives for optimal 
enforcement of laws, and support this argument by comparing 
the regulation of securities markets (including disclosure 
requirements) through corporate and securities laws in Poland 
and the Czech Republic. Romano (2001) argues for the 
introduction of regulatory competition in which firms choose 
the regulatory regime to which they will be subject from 
available jurisdictions around the world. Admati and Pfleiderer 
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presence of externalities to public disclosure (disclosure by one 
firm provides information about other firms), mandatory 
disclosure requirements often are unable to achieve welfare-
maximizing outcomes.
A variety of interesting empirical issues emerge concerning 
the effects of accounting and disclosure regulation. For 
example, to what extent does governmental adoption of 
superior accounting rules actually lead to superior corporate 
accounting practices, and what other institutional factors must 
be present for such an effect?21 To what extent do disclosure 
requirements lead to higher quality voluntary disclosures, as 
discussed in Ball (2001)?
The BPS measurement scheme is of limited use for 
empirical investigations into the regulation of corporate 
reporting because it reflects corporate reporting practices 
resulting from both voluntary and mandatory reporting 
behavior. Hence, an important step for future research is to 
develop a multinational database of domestic corporate 
reporting regulatory environments to facilitate future research 
into the causes and effects of accounting and disclosure rules 
and regulations. 
Other aspects of the information environment. Our focus above, 
corporate transparency, is but one aspect of the domestic 
information environment. Although we believe that corporate 
transparency is a fundamental feature of the information 
environment in an economy, we think that it is useful to extend 
the research proposed above to consider other types of 
transparency. Vishwanath and Kaufmann (1999) describe a 
more comprehensive framework for transparency that includes 
transparency in both the public and private sectors.22 We think 
that such research has much potential for contributing to a more 
complete understanding of the economics of information.
6. Summary
In this paper, we discuss economics-based research focused 
primarily on the governance role of financial accounting 
information and propose future research ideas. We present a 
framework that isolates three channels through which financial 
accounting information can affect the investments, 
productivity, and value-added of firms. The first channel 
involves the use of financial accounting information by 
managers and investors in identifying promising investment 
opportunities. The second channel is the use of financial 
accounting information in corporate control mechanisms that 
discipline managers to direct resources toward projects 
identified as good and away from projects identified as bad. 
The third channel is the use of financial accounting 
information to reduce information asymmetries among 
investors.
We discuss economics-based research on the use of 
accounting information in particular governance mechanisms. 
Topics include the prevalence of financial accounting numbers 
in managerial contracts, trends in the use of accounting 
numbers for contracting with managers, properties of 
accounting and choice of governance configurations, and 
financial accounting information and additional corporate 
control mechanisms. We then discuss cross-country research 
that investigates the effects of financial accounting information 
on economic performance and present a conceptual 
framework for characterizing and measuring corporate 
transparency at the country level, including many ideas for 
future research.Endnotes
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1. See Black (2000) for a useful discussion of this thesis.
2. For more information, see the IASB web site: 
<http://www.iasc.org.uk>.
3. See Ball (2001) for an in-depth discussion of the connection 
between the emphasis in accounting standards on the verifiability of 
financial statement data and the credibility of managers’ disclosures to 
the market.
4. See Levine (1997) for a review of theories linking financial 
development and economic growth of an economy. 
5. For example, Chang et al. (2000) document that cross-country 
differences in analyst following are positively correlated with the 
quality of financial accounting regimes.
6. While we focus on beneficial effects, theory identifies potential 
adverse consequences of public information. For example, the early 
release of public information can destroy risk-sharing opportunities 
(Hirshleifer 1971; Marshall 1974); signaling of private information 
can result in overinvestment or other misallocations of capital (Spence 
1973); more frequent reporting of information can increase moral 
hazard costs by increasing the scope of strategic behavior available to 
managers (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1987; Abreu et al. 1991; Gigler 
and Hemmer 1998); information release can complicate contract 
renegotiation and impose agency costs if parties cannot commit not to 
renegotiate contracts (Laffont and Tirole 1990; Demski and Frimor 
1999); public release of proprietary information can distort 
investment behavior (Darrough 1993).
7. See Barry and Brown (1985) and Merton (1987) for analysis of the 
impact of estimation risk and incomplete information, respectively, 
on the cost of capital.
8. In contrast, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Bhide (1993) argue that 
liquid stock markets and diffuse ownership structures can reduce 
shareholders’ incentives to monitor the managers, and thus impede 
economic efficiency. Levine and Zervos (1998) proxy for liquidity of a 
country’s stock market as the value of stock trading relative to the size 
of the market (turnover) and the value of trading relative to the size of 
the economy. Using a cross-country design, they find both measures 
to be positively and significantly related to rates of economic growth, 
capital accumulation, and productivity growth.
9. In contrast, Barro and Barro (1990) do not find a relation between 
accounting-based measures and turnover for a sample of large bank 
CEOs, but do find an inverse relation between stock price 
performance and turnover. A number of papers also examine the 
relation between the probability of executive turnover and stock price 
performance. These include Coughlin and Schmidt (1985), Warner 
et al. (1988), and Gibbons and Murphy (1990). See Murphy (1999) for 
an extensive discussion of this literature along with additional 
empirical analysis.
10. See also Kang and Shivdisani (1995) for evidence that top 
executive turnover in Japan is related to accounting performance.
11. Other examples of research on specific governance mechanisms 
include boards of directors (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1996; 
Beasley 1996), audit committee characteristics (Klein 2000a, b), 
shareholder litigation (Kellogg 1984; Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper 
1994; Skinner 1994), debt contracts (Smith and Warner 1979; 
Leftwich 1981; Press and Weintrop 1990; Sweeney 1994), and the 
audit function (Feltham, Hughes, and Simunic 1991).
12. Regime shifts within a country or region of the world (for example, 
privatization), however, also may provide rich opportunities for 
examining the effects of financial accounting information and 
economic growth and efficiency.
13. The proxy is the fraction of stocks in a country whose prices move 
in the same direction in a given week, as reported in Morck et al. 
(2000). Following Morck et al., stock market synchronicity is 
interpreted as a low amount of firm-specific information impounded 
in stock prices in a given country. Wurgler (2000) represents one of 
the few “direct” tests (of which we are aware) of whether the 
informational efficiency of the stock market enhances the efficiency 
with which corporate resources are directed toward value-creating 
opportunities. We return to this issue in Section 5. Also see Durnev 
et al. (2000).
14. See La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) for 
evidence on differences in investor legal protections between code-law 
and common-law countries.
15. We use the term “private information acquisition” to mean both 
the superior processing of publicly reported information and the 
collection of private information through discussions with managers, 
customers, suppliers, and others.
16. Djankov, McLiesh, Nenova, and Shleifer (2001) document a 
variety of social, political, and economic effects of cross-country 
differences in the prevalence of state versus private media ownership.Endnotes (Continued)
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17. The informational efficiency of the stock market concerns the 
speed and accuracy with which information is reflected in stock prices. 
Tobin (1982) defines the functional efficiency of the stock market as 
the extent to which the stock market directs resources to their highest 
valued uses.
18. Bushman and Smith (2001) discuss a variety of cross-country 
empirical designs based on the recent economics and finance 
literatures that they suggest can be used to explore the economic 
effects of financial accounting information. The same designs can be 
used to explore the economic effects of corporate reporting, of which 
financial accounting information is a key ingredient, as well as the 
economic effects of information dissemination and private 
information acquisition and communication.
19. For example, Rajan and Zingales (2001) develop and test the 
theory that incumbent firms apply political pressure to suppress 
financial development to reduce domestic competition, and this 
tendency varies the openness of the domestic economy to foreign 
competition. Vishwanath and Kaufmann (1999) discuss how 
transparency in the private sector may be impeded by a lack of 
transparency in the public sector. Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, and 
Walsh (1999) discuss how research into the political determinants of 
economic development has been stifled by the lack of detailed, 
objective data on the political and institutional features of countries, 
and introduce a large database to facilitate such research.
20. See, for example, Stigler (1964), Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
Easterbrook and Fischel (1991), and Coffee (1999). Watts and 
Zimmerman (1986) discuss specifically the literature on regulation 
of disclosure.
21. See Ball (2001) for a discussion of a variety of infrastructure 
requirements for quality financial reporting.
22. The Opacity Index, developed by PriceWaterhouse-Coopers, 
represents a recent attempt to measure transparency broadly, 
incorporating transparency in both the public and private sectors 
of each economy.References
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